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China’s Local Government Debt and Economic Growth
By Tom Zhou

Abstract
This paper explores the impact of China’s local government debt on economic
growth. This analysis, based on a panel of 31 provinces over 14 years, takes
into account a broad range of economic growth determinants as well as various
estimation issues including heteroskedascity and omitted variable. The empirical
results suggest an inverse relationship between China’s local government debt and
economic growth, controlling for other determinants of growth: on average, a 10
percentage point increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown
in annual real per capita GDP growth of around 0.27 percentage points per year
I.

Introduction:
The financial crisis of 2007-2008, which originated in the United

States, was considered by many economists to be the worst financial crisis since
the Great Depression of the 1930s. It not only dragged down many financial
institutions in the U.S., but it also triggered the most severe economic contraction
in many foreign countries. Even though China, an export-led growth country, has
enjoyed double digit growth for the past ten years, China’s economy was also
threatened by economic contraction in the West. Fortunately, China’s economic
growth soon reclaimed lost ground thanks to a 4 trillion Yuan (USD 586 billion)
fiscal stimulus package aimed to upgrade infrastructure and transportation and
modernize different industries (Yerxa, 2011). Although the stimulus package
received lot applause for boosting growth and reviving the economic contraction,
it raised the leverage ratio for China’s government. Most importantly, the credit
loosening due to the stimulus plan has increased debt burdens for local Chinese
governments. As a matter of fact, the collapse of many private lending facilities
in Wen Zhou, an eastern city in Zhejiang Province, which was well known for its
exporting business, and other major cities in other provinces drew a lot of public
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attention to the health of China’s public debt especially at provincial level (Caixin
Magazine online, December, 2011).
Even though the worries that some local governments were not able to
pay back their debts after series of default events in many local cities in 2010
were intensified, it is still not clear whether China’s local government debts has a
significant impact on China’s economic growth. Most of current studies on China’s
local government debts rely on news analysis and observation. For instance, the
debt problem in Wen Zhou in 2010 drew a lot of attention from domestic and
foreign news media. Bloomberg, one of the most influencing financial media,
released a news report saying that, “China’s first audit of local government debt
found liabilities of 10.7 trillion yuan ($1.7 trillion) at the end of last year and
warned of repayment risks, including a reliance on land sales” (Bloomberg news,
2011). Professional economists and fiscal pundits such as Nouriel Roubini, an
economics professor at New York University’s School of Business, start publishing
paper to question the health of local government’s fiscal policy. Some of studies
may have a convincing inside story to conclude that the current borrowing level
carried by local government has detrimental effect on China’s fiscal sustainability.
However, whether or not the growing amount of debts held by local governments
has negative effect on China’s economic growth is still unclear at this stage.
Recently, there have been a lot researches focusing on the relationship
between government debt and economic growth. Also, many literatures identify the
determinants of China’s economic growth. Among all the literatures focusing on
the impact of government debt on economic growth, Kumar and Woo (2010) did a
distinguished job by providing an empirical analysis on the impact of high public
debt on long-run economic growth based on a panel of advanced and emerging
economies over four decades. Besides focusing on government debts, they also
include a broad range of determinants of growth. Their empirical results suggest
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an inverse relationship between government debt level and economic growth,
controlling for other determinants of growth. Besides the international evidence
of impact of government debts on economic growth, Lin (2003) identifies the
components of China’s government debt, which comprises domestic and foreign
debt. He concludes that risk of foreign debt is very low for China since China’s
foreign exchange reserves are much higher than total foreign debt outstanding.
For China’s domestic government debt, it is more complicated because domestic
debt consists of explicit fiscal deficits, local government debt, state banks’ nonperforming loans, and fiscal subsidies made to social security funds (Lin, 2003).
Lin (2003) attributes the local government debt to the tax system adopted in 1994.
Since local government cannot get enough revenue from tax due to the shared
tax collecting with central government, they have been running deficits since
1994. Lin (2003) concludes that if current tax system remains unchanged, local
government debts accumulated from fiscal deficits will cause a serious trouble.
However, what the two literatures above and other literatures focusing
on government debt and economic growth in China have not identified is the
impact of China’s local government debt. Most importantly, what Lin (2003)
did not emphasize is that the true cause of local government debt after the 1994
tax reform comes from local financing platform, which this paper will delve into
later. As a result, this paper intends to fill up the research gap by answering the
main question of the paper: does local government debt in China have significant
impact on China’s economic growth? In order to answer the question, this paper
will contribute to the empirical literature on the relationship between china’s
local government debt and economic growth by first providing a comprehensive
historical analysis on local fiscal policy and implementation plan in China and
then constructing a panel regression model by using cross provincial dataset. This
regression model will include provincial GDP per capita growth from 1994 to
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2011 as dependent variable and local debts and other determinants of economic
growth from 1994 to 2011 as independent variables. And finally, this paper will
run regressions to test whether local government debt has significant impact on
China’s economic growth.
The results, based on a range of econometric techniques such as ordinary
least squares (OLS), fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE), suggest an inverse
relationship between local government debt and economic growth, controlling for
other determinants of growth: on average, a 10 percentage point increase in the
debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown in annual real per capita GDP
growth of around 0.27 percentage points per year.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 has four main
parts. Part one provides an economic theory of government debt. Part two reviews
the empirical evidence of government debt. Part three reviews China’s fiscal
history and fiscal structure at local government. Part four highlights the debates
from economists and reiterates this paper’s key contributions. Section 3 introduces
the modeling and data. Section 4 discusses and interprets the regression results.
Section 5 concludes with further research suggestions.

II.

Literature Review
A. Economic theory of government debt
Before going too deep into China’s local government debt problems, two

critical questions are raised: why do high debt levels affect future growth, and
how does high debt level affect future growth? From a conventional view, the
government’s debt policy affects the economy both in the short run and in the
long run. Government debt and deficit is interrelated because a country with a
large debt have difficulty to finance annual deficits through more borrowing and,
consequently, will be more likely to raise tax to collect more revenue. Therefore,
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we begin analyzing the effect of debt on economic growth by discussing the shortrun effects of budget deficits.
In the short run, if the government creates a budget deficit by holding
spending constant and reducing tax revenue, this policy will raise households’
current disposable income. Based on the Keynesian view, the increases in income
and wealth boost household spending on consumption goods and thereby, raise
the aggregate demand for goods and services. In the long run, suppose that the
government holds spending constant and reduces tax revenue, this policy creates
a budget deficit and decreases public saving assumed the economy follows this
identity:
� + � − � = � + ���

Where S is private saving, T is taxes, G is government purchases of goods and
services, I is domestic investment, and NFI is net foreign investment. The left side
of this equation is national saving, which is the sum of private and public saving
while the right side indicates save funds for investment at home and abroad. This
identity is also a description of the market for loanable funds (Elmendorf and
Mankiw, 1998).
If we adopt the conventional view that private saving rises by less than
public saving falls, then national saving declines. After national saving declines,
total domestic investment may decline as well because the sum of private and
public saving equals to the sum of investment and net export. Reduced domestic
investment will cause domestic capital stock to shrink, which implies lower
output and income. The marginal product of capital will be higher after total
capital becomes less and less. The rising marginal product of capital causes
the interest rate to rise. Meanwhile, labor productivity would decrease, thereby
reducing the average the average real wage and total labor income. (Elmendorf
and Mankiw, 1998) As a result, the lack of domestic investment and the reduction
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in productivity will drag down the total output in the economy, and thereby
slowdown the economic growth.
Despite the short term and long term effect of government’s debt policy,
debt financing is the center of financial system nowadays. Countries cannot
flourish without borrowing. When individuals have the ability to borrow to
expand their consumption level, the overall demand in the economy becomes
stronger. When business owners have the ability to borrow to expand their firms,
they are expanding the capacity of the economy to generate more jobs and
demands. However, past experiences teach us that we cannot borrow forever
because high leverage ratios create instability. As debt level increases, borrowers’
ability to repay becomes more sensitive to drop in asset prices and increase in
interest rate because once the prices of their collaterals drop, they are no longer
considered as creditworthy. After a series of default happens, lenders start to lose
faith in the market and to scale back their lending. Once the entire credit line
breaks, consumption and investment fall. Afterward, high unemployment rate
and insufficient aggregate demand will drag the real economy down. The real
economy will experience an even worse economic downturn if the level of debt
before crisis is enormous (Cecchetti et al, 2009).
B. Empirical Evidence of Government Debt
In order to see whether government debt problem poses a significant
effect on China’s economic growth, we have to find an accurate model that can
capture the effect of debt on economic growth. Rogoff and Reinhart (2010)
develop a model using data from 105 countries consisting of both advanced
and emerging economies from the past twenty years to analyze the relationship
between the public leverage ratio (debt-to-GDP ratio) and average GDP growth.
Based on their calculation, they come up with a threshold for debt-to-GDP ratio.
When the debt-to-GDP ratio rises above 90 percent, median growth rates fall by
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one percent, and average growth falls considerably more. Also, they find that the
thresholds for both advanced and emerging economies are similar even though
emerging economies will more likely face a worse economic downturn when
debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 90 percent. Moreover, emerging markets face a lower
threshold for external debt, which is usually denominated in a foreign currency.
When external debt in emerging economy exceeds 60 percent of GDP, annual
growth declines by about two percent (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010). In addition,
high debt level not only limits country’s long run economic growth, but it also
limits the effectiveness of fiscal policy.
However, the model developed by Rogoff and Reinhart does not take
reverse causality into account. High debt can potentially lower the future economic
growth, but low economic growth also can cause debt to grow in the long run.
As a result, analyzing government debt requires a more comprehensive model
because economic growth is determined by many factors ranging from political
structures to cultural aspect. If a model cannot fully cover all the determinants
of economic growth, the impact of debt on economic growth is biased. In a
paper written by Robert Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth in a Panel of
Countries (1997), he provided a framework to analyze the factors that determine
the economic growth rate in different countries. He derives his model from the
hypothesis from the neoclassical growth model that poorer countries typically
grow faster per capita at initial level and thereby catch up with the richer countries.
The convergence hypothesis of neoclassical growth model implies that the growth
rate of real per capita GDP during a time period would tend to be inversely related
to the level of real per capita GDP in the initial year. In this model,
� = � �, �∗

Where g is the growth rate of per capita output, y is the current level of per capita
output, and is the steady-state level of per capita output. If the current level of
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per capita output, y, is high, the growth rate of per capita output, g, will diminish
for a given steady-state level of per capita output,. If holding the current level of
per capita output constant, the growth rate of per capita output will increase with
a rise in the steady-state level of per capita output, because the improvements in
external conditions such as government regulations, law, and market openness,
are beneficial to the long-run growth of the economy. The steady-state level of per
capita output is determined by a number of factors comprising social, economic,
cultural and demographic. In addition, the steady-state level of per capita output
is also determined by political factors such as the degree of political freedom, the
extent of market efficiency, and size of government expenditure (Barro, 1996).
Barro’s model provides a frame work to analyze the determinants of
economic growth even though he does not take government debt into account.
To test whether government debt has significant effect on economic growth
empirically, debt has to be added as a new variable into the model. Recently, the
empirical literature on debt and economic growth has grown. But many of those
growth regressions used in the literature have many shortcomings. Instead of
focusing on a few socioeconomic variables that are statistically significant, they
tend to include as many variables as possible to mitigate omitted variable bias.
Even though they may correct omitted variable bias, they commit multicollinearity
errors where two or more predictor variables in a multiple regression model are
highly correlated. As a result, it is better to focus on a core set of explanatory
variables that have shown a strong and consistent relationship with economic
growth. If there are some extra variables that are important to explain economic
growth, we can include them in the model while keeping the same core variables.
Specifically, the findings of Kumar and Woo (2010) select the core
sets of growth determinants, which are consistent with Barro’s model. Besides
selecting the core sets of growth determinants, Kumar and Woo utilizes a variety
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of estimation methodologies, such as pooled OLS, robust regression, between
estimator, fixed effects panel regression, and system GMM (SGMM) dynamic
regression to capture the effect of government debt on economic growth. Since there
are many sources of bias that can result in inconsistent estimates of the coefficients
in panel regressions ranging from omitted-variables bias to endogeneity, using
different estimation methodologies will mitigate them. The econometric results
from Kumar and Woo (2010) suggest an inverse relationship between initial debt
and subsequent growth after controlling for other determinants of growth: a 10
percentage point increase initial debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown
in annual real per capita GDP growth of around 0.2 percentage points per year. On
average, a 10 percentage point increase in initial debt is associated with a decline
of investment by about 0.4 percentage points of GDP. Cecchetti et al (2009) use
similar methodology analyzing data from OECD to conclude that high debt is
bad for growth. When public debt is above 85 percent of GDP, further increases
in debt may begin to have a negative impact on growth. More specifically, a 1
percentage point increase in corporate debt is associated with an approximately
2 basis point reduction in per capita GDP growth. A 1 percentage point rise in
household debt-to-GDP is associated with a 2.5 basis point reduction in growth.
While the cross-country empirical results from Kumar and Woo (2010)
and Cecchetti et al (2008) conclude the negative effect of government on economic
growth despite of the size of economy, they have not emphasized the importance
of local government debts especially in China. Even though a lot of previous
literature helps explain and identify the determinants of China’s economic growth,
only a few of them start to emphasize the importance of China local government
debt on China economic growth in recent years. However, finding the variables
that best explain China’s economic growth is still very challenging due to the
uniqueness of China’s economic structure. Most importantly, just like what
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Lin(2003) mentions in his paper, “No one knows exactly how large is the local
government debt. It is believed that township government debt is widespread and
severe.” Because of this, finding the correct variable to represent China’s local
government debt is a very challenging task for this paper. Therefore, the first step
before constructing a model that explains the effect of China local government
debt on China’s economic growth is to review the history of China’s fiscal policy
at provincial level.
C. China’s fiscal history and local government’s fiscal structure
China’s debt problems are much more complicated than developed
countries because China’s unique political system yields a different fiscal
policy implementation plan. Before going to empirical analysis of China’s local
government debt, we have to review the history of fiscal policy and the fiscal
structure of China’s local government.
After Deng Xiaoping introduced the market economy to China in 1980,
China’s economy started to take off. Between 1980 and 1999, the average growth
rate of China’s GDP was around 9.5 percent. However, the robust growth of China’s
economy did not increase the central government’s revenue because the tax system
implemented in 1980 was not efficient enough to generate revenue for central
government. The budgetary revenue-to-GDP ratio decreased from 28.4% in 1979
to 12.6% 1993. Most importantly, the central government revenue-to-total revenue
ratio decreased from 46.8% in 1979 to 31.6% in 1993 (Zhu, 2007). The insufficient
revenue in central government diminished its authority in the implementation of
fiscal policy. The central government was sometimes forced to borrow money from
other local governments between 1980 and 1990 (Zhu, 2007).
One of the main reason that central government could not collect
enough revenue to support its expenditure was China’s centralized fiscal system,
which relied on local government agencies to collect revenues for transfer to
111

the national treasury. Each local government had an assigned duty to collect a
certain amount of tax by the end of each year. In return, the central government
assigned re-transferring revenues to local governments’ budgets. Because such
a policy was basically a part of socialist planned economy, where everyone eats
from the same pot, local governments had no incentives to promote the local
economy. In addition, in order to address the insufficient revenue, China’s central
bank, People’s Bank of China, had to print more money to ensure that there
was enough money circulating around the economy. Such an aggressive money
printing policy eventually resulted in the risk of high inflation. Many economists
and policymakers in China during that time started to worry about the central
government’s fiscal authority, and called reform in the tax system. However,
because of different political interests, the tax reform did not take place until 1994
after a series of fiscal crises in central government (Zhu, 2007).
To address problem of inefficient fiscal policy, China’s Prime Minister,
Zhu Rongji, who was an economist himself and a devout follower of Milton
Friedman, decentralized China’s tax system in 1994 by introducing a new tax
system called the Tax Sharing System although he was under a lot political pressure
from different interest groups. Before 1994 reform, there were three categories of
taxes levied in China: the industrial and commercial tax, tariff, and the agriculture
tax (Zhu, 2007). The three main taxes were controlled by central government. The
new tax sharing system introduced in 1994 basically separated the tax revenue
collected by central and local governments. The tax revenue (not tax legislation),
according to the new sharing system, is divided in a way that some taxes are
exclusively assigned to the central level, some are assigned exclusively to the
local level, and some taxes are shared between both levels based on a fixed ratio.
For central government, the tax revenue comes from taxes such as consumption
tax, tariffs, vehicle acquisition tax, and business tax. For local government, the
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tax revenue comes from taxes such as urban maintenance and construction tax,
vehicle and vessel usage license tax, and orientation adjustment tax on investment
in fixed asset. Since VAT (Value-added Tax) and income tax are the two largest
tax revenues, they are divided between the central and local level. For VAT, the
central level takes 75% while the local level takes 25%. For both individual and
Enterprise Income Tax, the central level takes 60% and local level takes 40%. The
new tax sharing system basically left local government no choice but to generate
as much tax revenue as it could to support its annual expenditure level. As a result,
the new tax sharing system provides incentives for local governments to generate
more tax revenues by promoting their local economies (Zhu, 2007).
However, although the new tax system was designed to generate more
revenue for the central government, it also limits the range of tax revenues
collected by local government. From 1960 to 1985, local governments had budget
surpluses. From 1986 to 1993, even though local government started experiencing
deficits in some years due to the fixed asset investments, they soon recovered the
“lost ground” in following years. But the tax reform in 1994 changed everything.
Local government budgets jumped from a surplus of 6.1 billion yuan in average
in 1993 to a deficit of 172.7 billion yuan in average in 1994 (Lin, 2003). Basically,
starting in 1994, almost every local government from 31 provinces had a budget
deficit each year. In addition, since China is currently undergoing massive
infrastructure spending in different provinces after 1994, the local governments
have to find another way to come up with more funds besides tax revenue to fund
their building projects.
However, no matter how fast a local economy can develop, its economic
capacity cannot expand without enough budget revenue to support. Since even
the richest provincial government such as Guangdong province, one of the first
provinces to experience market reform in 1980 had a hard time to collect enough
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revenue to finance their annual budget deficit. Moreover, because the tax and
budget reforms enacted in 1994 prohibit local governments from issuing bonds,
the local governments could not simply issue debt to finance their projects. After
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the local governments came up with a new way
to generate more funds. The law forbids the local governments to issue debts
directly, but it doesn’t prohibit them to generate funds indirectly by setting up an
entity called the Local Financing Platform (LFP) (Walter and Howie, 2011).
These LFPs provide non-tax revenue to local governments to fund their
operating budgets. Their sources of fund come from bank loans. But the question
is how those LFPs can secure bank loans that local governments cannot obtain
directly. In order to circumvent restrictions on local government borrowing from
bank, local governments create corporations that act as the borrowers to obtain
loans from banks. These corporations consist of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE)
and local incorporated investment companies. Sometimes they combine together
to form a financial entity such as a private equity or a fund management company.
The mechanism of the local government funding process through Local Financing
Platform is not hard to comprehend. Basically, local governments contribute lands
to local financing platforms and provide tax subsidies for them. The LFPs have
lands as collaterals to borrow money from banks. Meanwhile, the LFPs use the
lands they obtained from local governments to develop infrastructure projects
such as high ways, railways, and airports. One the one hand, these infrastructure
projects is beneficial to those LFPs because they solely control the profits from
these projects. For example, China Railway Company was one of the biggest LFPs
in northern China before the head of this company was arrested in 2010 because
of corruption. They controlled 99% of railways in northern China. More than half
of the profits made from ticket selling and cargo shipping goes to this company.
They not only used the profits to develop more railways, but they also started
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developing real estate projects in Beijing, Tianjing, and other major metropolitans
in China to expand their financial influence. On the other hand, these projects
developed by LFPs are beneficial to local economy. When a new railway or real
estate project starts, they need more workers to work and more raw materials
such as cement and steel to build bridges and airports, and thereby increase total
industrial outputs at local level. That is why some provinces such as Guangdong,
the biggest provinces in southern China, and Zhejiang, the biggest provinces in
eastern China, experienced accelerating economic growth in recent years.
While the LFPs start developing projects, they secure more loans for
local governments to finance their deficits. Since local governments need to pay
wages to their employees, to provide funding for public schools, and to pay for
healthcare payments to local government staff, the amount of revenue they get
annually cannot cover their expenditure level due to the 1994 tax reform. After
LFPs get loans from banks that are owned by the state by providing lands as
collateral, local governments no longer experienced insufficient funds. Also, local
governments can invest in those LFPs, which issue primary shares, to become one
of the largest shareholders who can get dividend payment every year. Meanwhile,
the LFP can issue municipal bonds backed by local government and sell them to
bank and municipal bond investors. Then the cash obtained from bonds sell goes
to local government to finance their budget deficits and other expenditures. Thus,
the local financing platform serves as an agent to pass the loans from bank to
local government (Walter and Howie, 2011). On the surface, this funding process
between local governments and LFPs are mutually beneficial. Local governments
do not have to beg money from central government in Beijing to finance their
budget deficits and infrastructure projects. LFPs can get the lands for their projects
at an artificially low price. Also, they can pay fewer taxes than other corporations
especially private corporations.
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Theoretically, the whole funding process should work perfectly well
under a high economic growth because the platform’s capacity for borrowing
money from banks depends on the value of the collateral, which is mostly land.
Because LFPs use the lands to develop real estate projects such as office buildings,
resident houses, and shopping malls and other infrastructure projects, the price of
the land might triple due to the increase in demands for housing or rental business.
The repercussion of the increase in price of this land will spread to lands nearby.
If the economic growth does not slow down in the near future, the price of lands
will increase for a long period. The more valuable the land, the more money the
LFPs can borrow from banks. Most importantly, those loans backed by the lands
will not turn sour if the price of land is still very attractive for investment.
However, once the economic growth starts to slow down, it will be unclear
whether the loans obtained by LFP to fund local government budget deficits and
expenditures become a Chinese style of “subprime mortgage crisis”. Recently,
because of global economic slowdown, China cannot immune from the global
repercussion. China’s GDP growth went down from 14.2% in 2007 to 9.6% in
2008 due to the global financial crisis. Even though the 9.6% growth is still faster
than a lot of countries, the 4.6% drop of GDP growth still had a lot impact on
China’s economy especially at housing sector (World Bank Data). Based on the
data from Global Property Guide, house prices in China rose rapidly from 2000
to 2008, primarily driven by low interest rate and cheap credit (Global Property
Guide). The skyrocketing house prices were partly caused by speculator who
wished to make a huge fortune from selling their homes at higher price. Since it
was cheap and easy to obtain a home loan, anyone can become a speculator. Most
importantly, China was still lack of regulation in homeowner loan market. Many
people who did not have a good credit history could easily take out a loan to buy
house. As the economy started showing sign of weakness, the speculators pulled
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out from the housing market. The lack of demand for houses caused the house
prices to drop at the beginning of 2009.
But economic slowdown was not the primary reason causing home
price to drop in China. In order to ease public complaint over the skyrocketing
house prices in Beijing, Shanghai, and other major metropolitan areas due to the
speculative activities before 2009, the government adopted some housing marketcooling measures in April 2010. For instance, the down payment for first-time
buyers’ mortgages was increased to 30% from 20%, while for second homes
down payment rose to 60% from 50%. New property taxes were introduced in
Shanghai and Chongqing between 0.4% and 0.6% in Shanghai (Global Property
Guide). These government measures caused house prices to drop substantially
in the last quarter of 2011. After house prices dropped, the price of land also
decreased. Since those loans obtained by LFPs from banks are backed by lands as
collaterals, the sudden drop in house prices will cause those loans to sour.
Theoretically, under the contract between borrower and banks, if the
price of land drops, the borrower has to use other methods such as liquidation to
pay back what it owes to the banks and bond investors. However, that was not the
case in China. According to an article from Bloomberg News, written by Henry
Sanderson and Michael Forsythe, “China Cities Value Land at Winnetka Prices
with Bonds Seen Toxic”, many local governments tried to overstate the land value
by three to four times the actual value in order to secure more loans from banks. In
one case, local officials were not even able to the specify the exact location of the
specific property securing loan, reportedly stating, “it’s somewhere north of town,
I don’t exactly known where. It’s like the land outside the city, you know, with
the big piles salt” (Bloomberg News, July 13, 2011). This investigation done by
Bloomberg News clearly indicates that the attitude by local government officials
towards repayment of the loan was disturbingly noncommittal and dismissive.
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Recent data from China’s statistical yearbook indicates that the growth of loans
in each province has already reached an unprecedented level. Also, most of
loans shown in China’s statistical yearbook are one-year loans. Also, since only
state-owned banks have authority to issue loans in China, the close relationship
between state-owned banks and LFPs, which are mainly the cover identities of
state-owned enterprises in each province, gives local governments a back channel
to take out more loans no matter how turbulent the overall economy around the
world is. Therefore, given by the evidence provided by Bloomberg try to pay back
the loans they ask LFPs to borrow in previous years.
As a matter of fact, not many people before 2008 paid too much attention
to the transaction between local governments and LFPs and most importantly, the
amount of debt existed under local government’s balance sheet, because China
was still on an accelerating growth before 2008. But after the growth correction in
2009, local government’s unique funding process drew both applause and criticism
from different economists after China experienced economic slowdown at the
beginning of 2010. One the one hand, one group of economists thinks financing
through LFP is less transparent and less manageable than direct government
borrowing. The opaque business agreement between LFP and local government
leads many economists to question the accuracy of the official reported number
of total loan that local governments borrow each year. Also, they worry that the
enormous amount of loan accumulated each will have a negative impact on China’s
economy. On the other hand, some economists think that borrowing from LFP to
finance infrastructure projects is beneficial to the economy because these projects
will ultimately contribute to long-term economic growth. If the local government
has ability to generate enough revenue to pay off its loans from previous years,
LFP borrowing will not hurt the whole economy.
The pro sides of local government borrowing think because China
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is still a developing country, the space for future growth is enormous. A wellknown economist, Justin Lin who is a Chinese economist and former Chief
Economist and Vice President of the World Bank recently said in his speech,
Beyond Keynesianism and The New “New Normal”, that China is not going to
collapse because of global recession since China’s potential economic growth is
still strong enough to compensate short run economic shock. Unlike the U.S. and
other western advanced economies, China is still undergoing a transition from a
poor country to a developed country. The large gap between rural area and urban
area provides China a valuable opportunity to continue its infrastructure projects
to reach urbanization. According to Lin, China’s fiscal expansionary policy during
the past ten years has raised government’s debt-to-GDP ratio, but if adding central
government debt and LFP loans together, the total debt-to-GDP ratio is around
40 percent. Comparing this number to other countries such as Japan and Greece,
China’s current debt-to-GDP ratio is still relatively healthy. In addition, not only
does China have a fine fiscal condition, China’s high household saving rate and 3
trillion U.S. treasury holding will provide adequate fund to expand its economy
(Lin, 2011).
Also, according to a report written by a group of economists from Credit
Suisse, most of loans borrowed by local government financing platform is largely
used in infrastructure projects. As shown in the graph, urban infrastructure and
transport projects accounted 62% of the loans and land purchases accounted
10.6%. Infrastructure and transport projects used more than 70% of the total loans
borrowed by LFPs. Even though it seems that the amount of loans is enormous,
local government’s assets are increasing from these investments. Unlike the public
debt used to pay for social pension fund and other benefits in Southern Europe,
local government’s debts in China are utilized to accumulate a large amount of
fixed assets to increase the total output. Thus, if China’s economic growth is
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steady over the next ten years, according to Credit Suisse, the debt problems at
local level should not be problematic.
However, even though Lin’s and Credit Suisse’s arguments that China’s
robust future growth mitigates government’s debt burden seems to be reasonable,
many independent research departments and economists cast doubts on his argument.
In a special report done by Bloomberg, China’s banks didn’t fully report the total
loans they lent to local government financing platform. For instance, Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), second largest state-owned banks in China,
reported in 2011 that they include the total loans borrowed by 10,000 LFPs across
the entire country in bank’s public report. However, Bloomberg sent its own
investigation team and found that ICBC only includes 113 LFPs, or about 2% of
those reported by the banks. The hidden loans, according to Bloomberg, sometimes
contained toxic assets, which came from failed real estate and infrastructure projects
from 2008 to 2011. Also, with prices dropping dramatically in China’s real estate
market in 2011, many local governments were struggling to sell lands to raise more
cash. Meanwhile, the decrease in land price causes the price of collaterals held by
LFPs to drop. As a result, they were not able to obtain enough loans from banks for
local governments (Bloomberg news, 2011).
In more scary news reported by Financial Times, it stated that some
local governments are having troubles paying their wages in their public servants
because of inadequate cash and loans:
For example, in the Shandong Province capital Jinan, not a
single developer bid for nine of the 11 plots offered by the city
in early November. The two plots that sold went for bottomline prices.
A city with a serious land market crash is Guangzhou, where in
November some 32-plots failed to sell. In some cases, auctions
were suspended by the city government, which blamed poor
market conditions.
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These plots were supposed to generate about 18.7 billion
yuan for Guangzhou’s city government, representing some 29
percent of the planned land sale revenues written into the 2011
fiscal budget. Asking prices averaged 5,584 yuan per square
meter of floor space (Financial Times, 2011).

Therefore, the decrease in residential real estate construction diminishes local
government’s ability to pay back their debts through land sales.
In addition to the scary China’s local government debts reported by
Financial Times and Bloomberg, Nouriel Roubini, a professor from NYU’s
Stern School of Business, criticized that the high borrowing by China’s local
governments eventually would become another “subprime mortgage” (Reuters
news, 2011). His reasoning behind the prediction of China’s debt problem was
based on his field study in 2011. He stated that even though local governments have
spent billions of dollars to upgrade city’s transportation, housings, and schools,
many investments cannot generate enough revenue to pay back those debts local
governments borrow. He gave an example of high speed Maglev train between
Shanghai and Hangzhou, another major city in eastern China. The governments of
Shanghai and Hangzhou spent billions of dollars to develop the high speed train
line. The initial investment was estimated around 300 million USD. Although the
new high-speed train has already cut the travelling time between the two cities
from four hours to less than one hour, the ticket is so expensive that frequent
travelers can just take regional jet with much cheaper price. As a result, most of
the trains were just half-empty. Roubini stated that the lack of passengers will
reduce the profit generated from the high-speed train line and diminish local
governments’ capacities to pay back their debts (Reuters news, 2011) (ProjectSydicate, 2011).
The high-speed train line between Shanghai and Hangzhou is just a
small corner of China’s investment story. Many local governments, according
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to Roubini, were developing the similar sumptuous projects, which could not
generate enough revenue to pay back debts they borrowed. He worried if local
governments continue the excessive investment, China’s local government debts
will become a new debt crisis, which will drag the whole country down.
D. Summary
At this stage, it is still not clear whether China’s local government
debts pose a significant threat to China’s economic growth although the some
economists suggests that China is facing a serious debt crisis. On the surface, the
debt problem at local level in China seems to be manageable since China is still on
the trend of high economic growth regardless of recent financial crisis. However,
the data from China’s Statistical Yearbooks from 1994 to 2011 and investigations
conducted by two authoritative news agents, Bloomberg and Financial Times,
indicate that the borrowing levels at local governments are still too high. The
question that whether the high level of debts held by local governments through
local financing platforms has significant impact on China’s economic growth
remains unanswered. Thus, the purpose of the rest of this paper is to provide
a quantitative analysis to answer the remaining question left from the previous
literature.
Before going deep into quantitative analysis, we still need to find the
right variable to represent local government. Since it is impossible to find exact
numbers representing China’s local government debts at this point, we have to find
a proxy number to represent China’s local government debts. In fact, based on the
previous literature, we can identify the correct variable for debt. Since this paper
centers around the loans borrowed by local governments through local financing
platforms, the amount of loans from all 31 provinces that report on China’s
statistical yearbook every year can be used as proxy variable to represent local
debts. Even though it is possible that many China’s local governments are willing
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to hide the actual debts they owe to the banks, the amount of annual loans from
each province shown in statistical yearbook, conducted by central government’s
banking regulation agencies and other statistical departments in Beijing, cannot
cover the truth because they have to fully analyze the health of state-owned banks,
which are public companies that list their shares in both mainland and Hong Kong
stock exchanges. Also, given the evidence provided by Credit Suisse’s report that
more than 70% of the debts borrowed by local financing platforms are short term
loans, which are set to mature by end of 2013, we can conclude that most of LFPs
are not going to pay back these debts. Moreover, we also have evidence from
Bloomberg that most local governments have not even paid attention with the
amount of debts they owe for a long time and, most importantly, they do not have
plans to pay them back. Thus, we can conclude that the annual short-term loans
from each province shown on China’s statistical yearbook are the best proxies to
represent China’s local government debt.

III.

Model Specification
Based on the findings in cross-country growth literature and discussion

on China’s local fiscal history, we adopt a cross-provincial panel regression model
to investigate the impact of local government debt on economic growth across
thirty-one provinces in China. The panel spans 17 years from 1994 to 2011.
The baseline panel regression specification is as follows:

��� = � + ��,� � + ���,� + ��,� ,

Where t denotes the end of a period; i denotes province; y is the growth rate of
real provincial income per capita; is an unobservable error term; is a vector of
economic variables; is local government debt (in percent of GDP).
Since Kumar and Woo (2010) and Barro (1996) uses a similar panel
regression model to analyze the impact of government debt on economic growth,
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this paper will select a core set of explanatory variables that have been identified
in previous literatures. The variables X in the baseline model specification are as
follows: human capital, to reflect the notion that provinces with an abundance
of knowledge are more likely have a greater chance of surpass other provinces
in the domestic competition; social-economic factors such as population growth,
inflation rate, provincial government expenditure growth, State-owned enterprise
industrial output growth, and personal disposable income growth.
The econometric model introduced above is actually based on the
neoclassical model, which identifies the factors of long-run economic growth.
In the neoclassical model, labor and capital are the two key components of
this model. Later on, technology also plays a key role in determining long-run
economic growth. But new technology requires advanced knowledge in order
for the technology to become fully applicable. As a matter of fact, knowledge
is acquired through a long duration of education. The higher the education, the
more efficient a worker will perform in the real world. Recently, more and more
empirical and theoretical research illustrate that human capital plays a key role
in determining economic growth. Nelson and Phelps (1966) use the experience
of United States agriculture to support the evidence that better education leads
to higher production level. The better educated farmer is quicker to adopt new
technologies through different channels. He understands how the new technologies
can help him to increase his output level since his education gives him ability to
assess different ideas, and hence less likely to make errors. As a result, he will
achieve a higher production level than other farmers.
Mincer (1981) and Barro (1996) identifies that investment in school
education is a very essential component of human capital. Employers are willing
to pay higher wages to workers who spend a lot of time and money to acquire
proper skills and experience that required by the job. In addition, both Mankiw et
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al (1992) and Barro (1996) include educational-attainment, which is the amount
of students graduating from middle school, in his model to test whether education
level has impact on economic growth. The empirical result from Barro (1996)
indicates that an increase by 0.3 year of education increase the per-capita GDP
growth by 0.2 percentage points per year. Mankiw et al (1992) use the percentage
of working-age population that is in secondary school as a proxy to measure
human capital. The empirical result from Mankiw et al (1992) also confirms the
strong correlation between education attainment and economic growth. Countries
with a higher level of education grow faster for a given level of initial per capita
GDP. After China reopened universities after ten years of Cultural Revolution,
the enrollment in higher institutions started to increase. Wang and Yao (2003)
use different level of school enrollment rate as a proxy for human stock. They
find that the accumulation of human capita was very quick from 1952 to 1999
and the empirical result confirms that it contributed significantly to grow and
welfare. Thus, in this paper, we use the growth of higher education enrollment as
an indicator of human capital.
Since this model has to use other economic determinants as control
variables, we have to take in account of the other interesting characteristics
reflecting on China’s economic growth. Even though the theoretical growth studies
have no conclusive evidence regarding the relationship between economic growth
and trade openness, most empirical studies illustrate that a country with a more
open trade policy will likely experience high economic growth. Barro (1991)
Yanikkaya (2003) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) use empirical evidence to
show that there is a significant correlation between a country’s trade growth rate
and economic growth. An improvement in trade growth stimulates and expands
domestic output. If a country uses its comparative advantage to produce product
with lower opportunity cost and trade with another country, it can result in more
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efficient use of its scarce resource and reach higher standards of living (Ball and
McCulloch, 1996). Most coastal cities in China have achieved high levels of
economic growth due to high trade volume since Deng Xiaoping opened China’s
economy to the world in 1989. Thus, trade growth is definitely an important
variable in this model. In this paper, we calculate the growth of trade (sum of
import and export) in each province starting in 1994.
Based on economic theory, unexpected inflation has three main costs
to the society. First of all, unexpected inflation leads to wealth redistribution. In
particular, the wealth of creditors may pass to debtors after unexpected inflation.
Second, uncertainty about future price levels is likely to distort consumption,
saving, borrowing and investment. In addition, variability of inflation has some
significant impact on wages. For instance, variable inflation causes risk-averse
workers to increase wage levels incorporated with premium, which serves as
insurance to against rising price in order to maintain the current lifestyle. This
will push up both nominal and real wages. Increase in nominal wage adds up
the production cost of producers, and thereby causes the overall price level in
the society to increase because producers are demanding higher price levels to
compensate their costs (Briault, 1995) (Sidrauski, 1967). However, unexpected
rising price in consumer goods may cause people to scale back their consumption.
Once aggregate demand falls, investment will decrease. Thus, theoretically, high
inflation has negative effect on economic growth. However, empirically, Barro
(1996) only finds some country experience economic downturn after inflation
level reaches certain level. According to Barro (1996), for a given rate of inflation,
the variability of inflation has no significant relationship with economic growth.
In this paper, we are not going to concentrate on this variable since inflation rate
in the model above is only a control variable.
High population growth has been found to have a detrimental effect
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on growth. If the population is growing, a part of the economy’s investment is
allocated to provide capital for new workers (Barro, 1996). The empirical evidence,
provided by Barro (1996), confirms that the relationship between population
growth and economic growth is negative. In this paper, population growth is only
used as a control variable in the model. We still expect the coefficient of this
variable to be positive.
The last two economic variables, industrial output growth and
infrastructure investment ratio, are very important variables to explain China’s
economic growth. After the market reform in 1980, China’s economy started to
take off mainly due to urbanization and investments in fixed assets. In this paper,
we use these two variables as control variables.

IV.

Data and facts
Since it is hard to find accurate data on China’s local government debt due

to the opaque governance in China, it is necessary to find a proxy number for the
amount of debt at local level. Because provincial short-term loans, as noted in
previous section, are the best variables to represent local government debts, we
will use this as the proxy for debt. Based on the table 2, the growth of provincial
loans from state-owned banks especially in Northern provinces has increased
dramatically over the past eleven years due to boom in housing market. As we can
see from the table, the total amount of short-term loans borrowed by Shanxi, a
resource-rich province in Northern China, was only 802 million yuan (133 million
US dollar), but in 2010, the amount of short-term loans went up to 9634 million
yuan (1605 million US dollar). The 110% increase in short-term loans in Shanxi
province over the past thirteen years is just a tip of iceberg among all the local
governments in China. Provinces in Southern China such as Hubei, as shown in
Table 3, experienced a 200% increase in short-term loans over the past 17 years.
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Thus, provincial short-term loan is the best proxies to represent local government
debt (China’s statistical yearbook).
Another proxy used in this paper is educational achievement, which
represents human capital. Since many previous theoretical models of economic
growth such as those of Barro (1991), Mincer (1981), and Nelson and Phelps
(1966) use educational achievement to serve as a proxy for human capital, this
paper will emulate the same proxy used in those studies. Data from China’s
annual statistical yearbook indicates that student enrollments in higher education
have increased dramatically since the end of Cultural Revolution in 1979. For
instance, the total of students enrolled into higher institutions in Anhui, one of
the poorest provinces in China in 1979, was only 294000. Thirty-two years later,
the number of higher institution students reached 990,000 in 2011. Not only has
Anhui experienced this tremendous increase in human capital, but other provinces,
which had the same economic growth level as Anhui in 1979, also have enlarged
its human capital over the past 30 years. The increase in stock of human capital in
most provinces in China indicates that the local governments have invested a lot
of their funds to improve educational level in China. As a result, this paper will
use student enrollments in higher education as a proxy to represent human capital.
Other key variables such as population growth, inflation rate, trade
growth, government expenditure, disposable income growth, State-owned
enterprise output growth, and infrastructure investment in percent of GDP are
obtained from the China’s Statistical Yearbook from 1994 to 2011. The main
analysis is based on a panel of 31 provinces for the period 1994-2011. The data
for infrastructure investment implies that China’s economy is strongly dependent
on government’s infrastructure investments such as bridges and highways. For
example, Beijing experienced a 17% annual increase in infrastructure investment
from 1997 to 2011. At the same time, Beijing’s annual real GDP growth reached
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almost 14% before 2007. The fast economic growth in Beijing is also happening
in other provinces especially those are heavily dependent on infrastructure
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Fitted Line: Growth=0.177-0.0364 local loan, where the loan coefficient is significant at 1%

Data on local government debt and growth clearly show that there is a
negative correlation between government debt and growth of real per capita GDP.
Figure shows a scatter plot of local government debt against subsequent growth
of real per capita GDP over seventeen-year periods in the full sample. According
to the OLS fitted line, the coefficient of local government debt is -0.036. Taken at
face value (i.e., ignoring the potential endogeneity problem, and not controlling
for other growth determinants), it suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in
local government debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown in per capita
GDP growth of 0.36 percentage points. This result is quiet consistent with the
similar result shown in Kumar and Woo (2010).
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V.

Estimation Strategy
As noted above, this paper intends to fill up the research gap by analyzing

the impact of China’s local government debt on economic growth empirically.
However, one of the most challenging obstacles facing this paper is to find an
array of potential economic determinants, which can be used as control variables
to explain economic growth. Even though Barro (1996) identifies an array of
potential economic determinants by regressing output growth on an array of
potential determinants, many variables he used in the paper cannot address the
concern of robustness. By solving this issue, recent studies such as Sala-i-Martin
et al (2004) focus on selecting the core set of growth determinants.
Sala-i-Martin et al (2004) uses Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates,
which constructs estimates by averaging ordinary least squared coefficients across
models, to conduct regressors selection, which can best explain economic growth.
Of all 67 explanatory variables, they find 18 to significantly and robustly partially
correlated with economic growth and another three variables to be marginally
related. Among the 18 variables, there are a few economic variables such as share
of government consumption in GDP, primary school enrollment, trade openness,
and the average price of investment goods. The rest of the variables relates to
socio-political factors such as fraction of population Confucian, which used to
explain the economic growth in East Asia.
This paper also consider a variety of estimation methodologies, such as
pooled OLS, random effect (RE), fixed effects (FE) panel regression, and GLS
regression. Each of estimation method has a trade-off. Although one method
corrects one particular econometric problem, it sometimes can lead to a different
type of bias. For example, the slope coefficients from pooled OLS regression
sometimes have the expected signs and the value is reasonably high. It also
assumes that the slope coefficients of the X variables are all identical for all the
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provinces. Obviously, there are restricted assumptions for OLS regression. Thus,
the pooled regression may distort the true picture of the relationship between
Y and the X’s across the 31 provinces in China. One way to take into account
the individual characteristic of each province is to let the intercept vary for each
company but still assume that the slope coefficients are constant across provinces
(Gujarati, 2003).
In addition, OLS regression sometimes encounters the presence of
heteroscedasticity because the usual OLS method does not follow this strategy and
thus does not make use of the “information” contained in the unequal variability
of the dependent variable Y. In this case, generalized least squares (GLS) takes
such information into account explicitly and is therefore capable of producing
estimators that are best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) (Gujarati, 2003).

VI.

Empirical results
This section reports econometric results estimating cross-province GDP

per capita growth rates in China. Five regressions are run on 557 observations
with 17 years of time span. Among the 31 provinces in China, autonomous regions
inhabited by different ethical groups such as Yunnan and Guangxi are under direct
control of central government. Also, municipalities such as Shanghai and Beijing
are under the authority of central government.
The main results for local economies are presented in Table 1. Columns
1-5 show that the coefficients of local government debt are negative and are
significant at the 1 percent level besides Column 1, with their values ranging
from -0.022 to -0.047 across the various estimation techniques. The ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation in Column 1 suggests a 10 percentage points of GDP
increase in local government debt is associated with a slowdown in growth in
real GDP per capita of around 0.24 percent per year. The random effect (RE) and
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general least square (GLS) in Columns 4 and 5 yield the same result. Even though
the FE estimate of debt coefficient in Column 3 is somewhat larger than other
estimates, it is still significant at 1 percent level. Also, the goodness of fit is quite
promising, with an adjusted ranging from 0.63 for FE estimation to 0.8 for OLS
estimation.
The coefficients on other explanatory variable (trade growth, government
expenditure growth, disposable income growth, industrial output growth and
investment in infrastructure to GDP ratio) are of the expected sign and mostly
significant at 1% percent level across different estimation techniques. However,
the coefficient for inflation is inconsistent with Barro’s theory that inflation has
negative effect on economic growth because in China’s case, inflation tends to
have positive effect on economic growth. Besides OLS estimation, all other
estimations for inflation are significant at 1%.
After running test on heteroskedasticity given by Breusch-Pagan test,
which tests the null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogenous.
Since the p-value is very small in this OLS regression, we would have to
reject the hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that the variance is
not homogenous. Besides test on heteroskedasticity, we also conduct test on
Multicollinearity. We use VIF, variance inflation factor, to test whether the OLS
has strong multicollinearity. As a rule of thumb, a variable whose VIF values are
greater than 10 may merit further investigation. In this case, the VIF and tolerance
(1/VIF) value for yeardum2 is worrisome. However, since yeardum2 is a dummy
variable control for year, the high VIF is negligible.
At last, model specification is final test we conduct on this OLS regression.
A model specification error can occur when one or more relevant variables in the
model. If relevant variables are omitted from the model, the common variance
they share with included variables may be wrongly attributed to those variables,
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the error term is inflated. We first use a link test command performs a model
specification link test for single-equation models. We will be looking at the p-value
for _hatsq, which stands for the variable of squared prediction. If the model
is specified correctly, the squred predictions should not have much explanatory
power. That is we would not expect the variable of squared prediction to be a
significant predictor if the model is specified correctly. In this case, the p-value
for _hatsq is 0.256. It indicates that the linktest has failed to reject the assumption
that the model is specified correctly. Thus, it seems to us that we do not have a
specification error. But now, we will conduct another test before we jump to the
conclusion. After running ovtest, the test result indicates there is small probability
that the model has omitted variables since p-value, 0.0483, is close to 0.05. The
model may have specification bias, but both ovtest and linktest indicate the bias is
not significant enough to be considered as problem.
Since the dataset for this regression model is a panel data, we have also run
a panel regression with fixed effects. The result is similar to OLS regressions, but
more variables become statistically significant. The coefficient of debt is negative
and significant at 95 percent of confidence interval. Also, the coefficient of -0.026
for FE is still in a similar range with OLS. Besides running fixed effect regression,
we also consider random effect regression. After running a Hausman test to test
decide between fixed or random effects. The null hypothesis is that the preferred
model is random effects vs. the alternative the fixed effects. It basically tests
whether the unique errors are correlated with the regressors, the null hypothesis is
they are not. Since the p-value is less than 0.05, we can conclude that we should
consider fixed effect regression as the best choices for panel regression.
After running heteroskedasticity test for FE, the test results still indicates
that the model has strong heteroskedasticity. Also, the Lagram-Multiplier test for
serial correlation also indicates that the model has strong serial correlation. As a
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result, in order correct both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, general-least
squares model is considered. The coefficient for debt in GLS regression is still
significant with a correct sign.

VII.

Conclusion
Given the empirical evidence on the impact of debt on economic

growth for a panel of 31 provinces in China over the period of 1994-2011, we
can conclude that local government debt in China does have significant impact
on China’s economic growth. The results, based on a range of econometric
techniques, suggest an inverse relationship between debt and economic growth,
controlling for other determinants of growth: on average a 10 percentage point
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown in annual per
capita GDP growth of around 0.23 percentage points per year.
Although econometric model cannot provide a concrete result that
China has already in a fiscal crisis, the negative correlation between debt-to-GDP
ratio and economic growth suggests that if local governments in China continue
the current spending path without considering any future consequences, local
government debt eventually will follow the path of Greece and other countries
with high government debts.
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Table 1. Panel Regression-Growth and Local Government Debt, 1994-2011
Sample: 31 Provinces in China
Dependent Variable : Provincial Real per Capita GDP Growth
Explanatory	
  Variables
Population	
  growth
Debt	
  to	
  GDP	
  ratio
Inflation	
  rate
Trade	
  growth
Higher	
  i nstitution	
  student	
  e nrollment	
  growth
Government	
  e xpenditure	
  growth
Disposable	
  i ncome	
  growth
Industrial	
  output	
  growth
Investment	
  i n	
  i nfrastructure	
  to	
  GDP	
  ratio
Constant
Observations
R-‐squared
Number	
  of	
  Province	
  Name
Standard	
  e rrors	
  i n	
  parentheses
+	
  significant	
  at	
  10%;	
  *	
  significant	
  at	
  5%;	
  **	
  significant	
  at	
  1%

Explanatory Variables
Population growth
Debt to GDP ratio
Inflation rate
Trade growth
Higher institution student enrollment growth
Government expenditure growth
Disposable income growth
Industrial output growth
Investment in infrastructure to GDP ratio
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of Province Name
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

OLS	
  (1)
-‐0.024
-‐0.037
-‐0.022*
-‐0.009
0.018
-‐0.084
0.013*
-‐0.006
-‐0.033
-‐0.036
0.077**
-‐0.022
0.161**
-‐0.041
0.027**
-‐0.01
0.082**
-‐0.015
-‐0.012
-‐0.017
557
0.8

Panel	
  Regression	
  (2)
-‐0.045
-‐0.047
-‐0.027**
-‐0.005
0.205**
-‐0.05
0.041**
-‐0.006
-‐0.117**
-‐0.021
0.032
-‐0.024
0.523**
-‐0.029
0.032**
-‐0.012
0.050**
-‐0.012
0.082**
-‐0.01
557
31

OLS (1)
-0.024
-0.037
-0.022*
-0.009
0.018
-0.084
0.013*
-0.006
-0.033
-0.036
0.077**
-0.022
0.161**
-0.041
0.027**
-0.01
0.082**
-0.015
-0.012
-0.017
557
0.8

Panel Regression (2)
-0.045
-0.047
-0.027**
-0.005
0.205**
-0.05
0.041**
-0.006
-0.117**
-0.021
0.032
-0.024
0.523**
-0.029
0.032**
-0.012
0.050**
-0.012
0.082**
-0.01
557
31
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FE	
  (3)
-‐0.023
-‐0.048
-‐0.042**
-‐0.011
0.219**
-‐0.05
0.042**
-‐0.006
-‐0.129**
-‐0.021
0.02
-‐0.025
0.507**
-‐0.029
0.027*
-‐0.012
0.053**
-‐0.013
0.103**
-‐0.015
557
0.63
31

FE (3)
-0.023
-0.048
-0.042**
-0.011
0.219**
-0.05
0.042**
-0.006
-0.129**
-0.021
0.02
-0.025
0.507**
-0.029
0.027*
-0.012
0.053**
-0.013
0.103**
-0.015
557
0.63
31

RE	
  (4)
-‐0.045
-‐0.047
-‐0.027**
-‐0.005
0.205**
-‐0.05
0.041**
-‐0.006
-‐0.117**
-‐0.021
0.032
-‐0.024
0.523**
-‐0.029
0.032**
-‐0.012
0.050**
-‐0.012
0.082**
-‐0.01
557

GLS	
  (5)
-‐0.045
-‐0.046
-‐0.027**
-‐0.005
0.205**
-‐0.049
0.041**
-‐0.006
-‐0.117**
-‐0.021
0.032
-‐0.024
0.523**
-‐0.028
0.032**
-‐0.012
0.050**
-‐0.012
0.082**
-‐0.01
557

31

31

RE (4)
-0.045
-0.047
-0.027**
-0.005
0.205**
-0.05
0.041**
-0.006
-0.117**
-0.021
0.032
-0.024
0.523**
-0.029
0.032**
-0.012
0.050**
-0.012
0.082**
-0.01
557

GLS (5)
-0.045
-0.046
-0.027**
-0.005
0.205**
-0.049
0.041**
-0.006
-0.117**
-0.021
0.032
-0.024
0.523**
-0.028
0.032**
-0.012
0.050**
-0.012
0.082**
-0.01
557
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Shanxi	
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1,894.66
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1,223.11
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1998
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2,519.04
3,326.57
1,629.12 3,488.18
2,795.20 2,903.18
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2003
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3,426.02
4,007.76
1,825.26 3,854.72
3,038.32 3,552.29
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2004

2000

13,577.45
3,821.38
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1,863.60 6,152.20
2,933.19 4,016.12
2,453.15

2005
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2,159.86 6,415.20
3,098.89 4,328.90
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15,335.50
4,722.38

2006
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2,519.04 7,411.88
3,488.18 4,788.51
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18,144.00
19,431.08
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13,123.80
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9,634.32
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33,367.00
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3,658.50
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3,870.30
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4,256.40
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1,194.51
421.07
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1995 2,979.33
1,750.41
1,494.03
2,123.00

5,495.69
8,195.83

1,055.67
1,423.48

755.39
2,804.16
1,156.13
2,948.15
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761.88 924.67
1,496.95

1998

1996 3,500.36
2,273.20
1,880.94
2,274.41

6,319.77
9,523.56

1,203.41
1,516.49
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3,359.54
1,358.61
3,151.74

610.51
840.631,194.51
1,713.97
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1997

8,195.83

3,528.13

2,408.36

10,934.76

1,719.19

1,423.48

1,156.13

2,948.15
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1,496.95

3,493.91

2,403.39

11,636.25
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1,613.25
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1,764.05
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1,064.82

1,987.83
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3,796.31
2002 5,000.74
4,312.79
3,227.46

18,190.85
15,206.62

2,320.66
1,941.07

2,774.81
2,244.72

5,910.59 1,403.92
1,714.042,418.48
2,955.57
5,158.76

2004

4,258.03
2003 5,377.43
5,000.74
3,796.31

19,491.77
18,190.85

2,759.65
2,320.66

3,246.28
2,774.81

6,475.92 1,714.04
2,020.042,955.57
3,398.29
5,910.59

2005

2004 5,649.67
5,377.43
4,258.03
4,590.03

19,491.77
23,261.21

2,759.65
3,056.86

3,246.28
3,719.52

6,475.92
6,743.00 2,020.04
2,303.903,398.29
3,987.58

2006

2005 6,430.44
5,649.67
4,590.03
5,173.87

23,261.21
23,182.16

3,056.86
3,595.25

3,719.52
4,388.28

6,743.00
7,833.32 2,303.90
2,696.113,987.58
4,803.51

2007

2006

23,182.16

2000
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2011

1998
1999
2000

2,979.33

2,123.00

3,500.36

2,274.41

3,528.13

2,408.36

3,493.91

2,403.39

913.93
596.96

6,037.40

8,465.64

6,989.42

11,659.37

9,369.81

1,871.98

2,244.72
1,871.98

4,498.55

1,824.04

1,064.82

1,987.83

1,212.23

2,173.45

5,158.76 1,212.23
1,403.922,173.45
2,418.48
4,498.55

26,776.12

4,287.79

3,595.25

4,388.28

7,833.32

2,696.11

4,803.51

8,465.64

6,989.42

30,224.01

5,066.68

4,287.79

5,131.69

9,200.93

3,128.63

5,671.66

11,659.37

9,369.81

38,893.06

5,066.68

6,320.81

7,268.41

6,320.81

11,163.39

3,569.27

6,594.33

11,303.76
201014,136.58
14,136.58
11,303.76

47,191.56
47,191.56

8,867.52
8,867.52

10,888.15 19,129.79
19,129.79 5,747.50
5,747.50
10,568.78
10,888.15
10,568.78

8,766.06

15,680.33

4,656.50

8,779.63

13,186.68
201116,395.39
16,395.39
13,186.68

53,411.83
53,411.83 10,408.54
10,408.54

13,001.39 22,033.21
22,033.21 6,841.92
6,841.92
12,114.59
13,001.39
12,114.59

2009

7,496.46

11,636.25

4,053.46

899.83

6,037.40

2008

5,173.87

10,934.76

3,924.16

7,496.46

2007

6,430.44

9,523.56

1,611.68

26,776.12
30,224.01
38,893.06

7,268.41
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11,163.39
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